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FOREWORD 
This is one of a series of reports prepared for the California Commission on Government 
established in the wake of Proposition 13 under the chairmanship of A. Alan Post. 
which issued its report and recommendations in January 1979, was concerned with the general area of 
state and local taxation and expenditure policies, the organization of state and local government, and with 
the impact of Proposition 13 on all of these. More than 50 study projects were commissioned, most in-
volving "task forces" of state and local officials, representatives of interest groups, and qualified specialists. 
In response to a request from the Commission, the Institute of Governmental Studies undertook 
four of the study projects under a research grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (Grant H-2944-G). Preliminary drafts of these reports were made available to the Commission in 
late fall, at the same time as comments and further information were from qualified persons, 
and incorporated into these final versions. (See next page for further details.} 
The Institute gratefuily acknowledges the support and cooperation of the Office of Policy Develop-
ment and Research of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, as well as the members 
staff of the Commission on Government Reform. We are pleased to have had the opportunity to contribute 
to the work of the Commission and to those policymakers who must now wrestle with the and 
controversial issues posed by Proposition 13. These and parallel issues will dominate the domestic "'"''"'''-''" 
of the nation during the 1980's. The need for objective analysis and informed judgments is criticaL These 
reports, it is hoped, meet both tests. 
January 1979 
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Director 
Reports for the California Commission on Government Reform, Chairman A. Alan Post 
published by the Institute of Governmental Studies 
Balderston, Frederick, I. Michael Heyman and Wallace F. Smith 
Proposition 13, Property Transfers, and the Real Estate Markets. 
IGS Research Report 79-L 1979 56pp + Appendices 
Fletcher, Thomas, Dennis Hermanson, John Taylor, Shirley Hentzell and Dean 
Allocating the One Percent Local Property Tax in California. 
IGS Research Report 79-2 1979 + 
Ann Robertson 
Formation for Local Governments. 
79-3 1979 Slpp 
and C. Lee 
State The Legislature or the Electorate. 
IGS Research Report 794 1979 lOOpp + 
Proposition 13 Research Inventory: A Partial 
fornia and Elsewhere, 3rd edition. 
Proposition 13 in the 1978 California 
of Research in the State of Cali-
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I. BACKGROUND 
Proposition 13 has lowered the annual costs of owning real 
in California. The larger is this cost reduction to the owner, the more 
important the immediate consequences for icular ownership decisions: 
to buy, sell, or lease; to build a new building; to renovate or add to an 
existing building. At the same time, changes in and, in some 
cases, of the amount and quality of public services follow from 
Proposition 13 and will also affect real-estate markets in various ways. 
Real-estate decisions, many thousands them, may have macro-
consequences for the California economy and will affect 
revenues &~d responsibilities. 
fie meanings of the new 
there is wide 
to the new conditions that may be made millions 
as to the 
as to the responses 
thousands of business enterprises, and many hundreds or thousands of 
governmental and public organizations. (Relatively modest shifts of 
assumptions fed into a UCLA forecasting model cted 
in California's rates of employment, unemployment, and total 
income.) 
For the purposes of this research transfers are 
transactions that shift control of real property from one economic unit 
to another and are regarded as substantive property transfers within the 
meaning of Proposition 13 and the 1978 implementing legislation. An owner-
ship change registered with the Recorder of Deeds is a typical example; but the 
Legislature, in Senate Bill 154 and Senate Bill 1212, excluded some transfers 
from consideration on the ground that they were essentially technical. Inter-
spousal transfers and deed recordings to convey title of previous joint-
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tenancy property to the surviving spouse are two cases in point. If these 
nominal transactions had not been excluded, the property would have lost 
"base year" treatment and a new assessment would be made as of the date 
of the technical property transfer. 
Our definition emphasizes change of control, not change of ownership, 
because, for example, leases of more than ten years are included as property 
transfers within the meaning of Proposition 13. (See Senate Bill 154, sec. 29.) 
Two not very surprising conclusions can be reported concerning what 
has in response to 
First 
ition 13 in the months since its 
tax come 
the rules 
the action 
difficult for decision-makers to absorb; and it has increased business 
market 
market 
for time. Second, fie 
are confounded with many other forces and 
Even when data become available from several 
after sage of 13, 
the 
real-estate 
or years of 
be very 
difficult to distinguish from the effects of numerous other variables that 
affect the volumes of property transfers, the amount of new construction, 
and the prices of real property. 
It is revealing, however, to analyze the reasons why uncertainty has 
increased and indicate some temporary consequences of this uncertainty. 
In addition, some elements of the market response to Proposition 13 can 
be analyzed, and the constitutional validity and the potential use of 
legal devices for property transfer can be discussed. 
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It is of interest to observe of both the housing and other real-estate 
markets that this decrease in the cost of hol 
exrected businessmen, other 
real-estate assets is 
to stimulate the real-
estate markets, both for exist ru1d for new construction. 
these of assets becomes more attractive relative to asset types 
and relative to the situation before passage of ion 13. Yet the 
is, of course, that other do not remain the same. The high 
of which there was lL'1i versal in the first few 
months after the June 1978 election arose from the a 
numbe o ffsett turn 
an ces for exist estate and the rates new construction. 
fu1 ideal way to approach the evaluation of ition l3's 
would be to begin from a fully defined econometric model of the market (say, 
the hous market) and inject the change in assessment and tax 
cost into that model. From this, the in values and the transaction 
turnover rate could be calculated from the relationships in the model. Also, 
the model might permit calculation of the rate of convergence to full " of 
market treatment of the whole stock of hous 
It is not possible to follow this econometric approach either for 
hous or for non-housing real- estate. Therefore, our invest ion 
consists of a series of efforts to clari elements of the of 
Proposition 13 by means of micro-economic is. 
Also, the research reported here was completed before passed 
the Revenue Act of 1978. This Act provides many owner-occupiers of resi-
dential property an exemption from tax on capital gains up to $100,000 on 
sale of the principal residence. This privilege may be exercised by the 
taxpayer only once. Other effects on the timing and character of property 
transfer decisions may well be swamped in importance by the great size of 
this tax reduction, but we have not sought to incorporate in this study the 
effects of the new capital-gains treatment. 
II. PROPERTY TURNOVER RATES 
Property turnover is important in the interpretation of Proposition 13 
because a property transfer triggers reassessment as of the date of transfer 
and therefore changes the property tax liability from "base year" treatment, 
or the previous assessed valuation adjusted by two percent per year. This, 
in turn, changes the costs of holding that property as compared with the 
costs prior to the transfer. (In today's generally inflationary climate, 
the assessment rises, and the tax liability and costs of property holding 
also rise. But it is quite conceivable that the transaction could take 
place at a lower price than the fair market value upon which the assessed 
value was based, thus resulting in a reduction of the property tax.) 
Property turnover rates, therefore, must be used for future estimates 
of the revenue from property taxes. In particular, turnover rates offer 
a signal of the extent to which base-year treatment is by current 
fair market value as the basis of assessment. Therefore, the extent of 
convergence of total property tax revenue in a county toward a level based 
on current fair market value depends upon the turnover rate in that 
(Of course, the average rate of property turnover does not tell the whole 
story. Some parcels of property may change hands repeateru_y while others 
remain in the same continuous ownership indefinitely. Thus, the nbase-year 
treatment11 extending back to 1975 will never be eliminated completely from 
a county assessor's rolls.) 
Total property~tax revenue in a county will, under foreseeable economic 
conditions, inevitably lag behind the tax yield based upon current fair market 
valuation even if every parcel of real property changes hands at the average 
5 
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turnover rate. /Proposition 13 provides for a 2% per year increase of 
assessed value from the last previous assessment based upon a transaction. 
Thus, if the average rate of price inflation for real property is greater 
than 2% per year, each parcel is valued for assessment purposes at less 
than the current year's fair market value most of the time. It "catches up" 
briefly when there is an ownership change,: and then it begins to lag behind 
again in subsequent years. The more frequently the property changes hands, 
the smal:::.er is the reduction of property tax payments below each year's 
current valuation. Property turnover rates in California counties have 
from to In this range the maximum valuation lag on a property 
s between five and twelve years. How the reduction in tax yield to the 
county and local governments will be, however, depends also upon the size 
of the difference between the average annual rate of ce inflation in 
real property and the allowable adjustment of 
illustrates this. 
per year. 2-1 
County by County Turnover Rates in California 
Table 2-1 shows gross property turnover in each county of fornia 
for the three most recently available assessment years. (The assessment 
year runs from March 1 of a year to February 28 of the year following, 
as the data presented come from county assessors to the State Board of 
Equalization as part of the standard workload reporting system.) Table 2-1 
shows substantial variation in gross property turnover between one year 
and another for a given county. It also shows big differences between one 
county and another. Finally, even though 1974-75 was a recession year and 
1976-77 was a good year in real-estate markets, Table 2-1 does not show 
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Figure 2-1: Lag in Assessed Value Behind Current Fair Market Value 
Assessed 
value of 
a parcel 
of real 
property 
($000 1 s) 
$50 
1975 
2% annual increase 
1980 1985 
T1 , T2 are transactions. 
Shaded area denotes assessment lag. 
2% annual increase 
1990 1995 Year 
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Table 2-1: Gross Property Turnover Rates, California Counties, 
Selected Years t 
Mar. 1' 1974- Mar. 1, 1975- Mar. 1, 1976-
County Feb. 28, 1975 Feb • 29, 1976 Feb. 28, 1977 
Alameda .135 • 141 .17l 
Alpine .183 .077 .139 
Amador .120 .143 .166 
Butte .163 .238 .203 
Calaveras .100 .092 .106 
Colusa .151 .188 .241 
Contra Costa .140 .130 .235 
Del Norte .290 .338 .185 
El Dorado .199 .200 .231 
Fresno .153 .192 .167 
Glenn .157 .140 .113 
Humboldt .188 .113 • 357 
Imperial .094 .102 .091 
Inyo .258 .236 .257 
Kern .122 .103 .138 
Kings .117 .097 .144 
Lake .158 .151 .134 
Lassen .234 .238 .143 
Los Angeles .137 .144 .163 
Madera .140 .113 .200 
tState of California, State Board of Equalization, Assessors' Budgets 
and Workloads Summaries, 1975-76, 1976-77, 1977-78 calendar years. 
Property turnover rates for each of the 58 California counties were 
calculated by dividing the total number of property transfers (for the 
corresponding assessment years) by the number of secured roll units. 
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Table 2-1 (cont'd) 
Mar. 1, 1974- Mar. 1, 1975- Mar. 1, 1976-
County Feb . 28, 1975 Feb. 29, 1976 Feb. 28, 1977 
Marin • 187 .173 .215 
Mariposa .138 .134 .264 
Mendocino .099 .107 .124 
Merced .175 .154 .165 
Modoc .091 .234 .163 
Mono .142 .160 .189 
Monterey .146 .156 .178 
Napa .145 .190 .193 
Nevada .223 .219 .254 
Orange .248 
.247 .213 
Placer .145 .142 .186 
Plumas .268 .282 .271 
Riverside .147 .143 .236 
Sacramento .151 .146 .209 
San Benito .123 .127 .164 
San Bernadino .130 .156 .149 
San Diego .148 
.137 .203 
San Francisco .174 .126 .139 
San Joaquin .135 .143 .179 
San Luis Obispo .158 .183 .223 
San Mateo .117 .123 .155 
Santa Barbara .138 .111 .161 
Santa Clara .240 .233 .233 
Santa Cruz .165 .150 .208 
Shasta .244 .241 .267 
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Table 2-1 (cont'd) 
Mar. 1, 1974- Mar. 1, 1975- Mar. 1, 1976-
County Feb. 28, 1975 Feb • 29, 1976 Feb. 28, 1977 
Sierra • 114 .137 .164 
Siskiyou .123 .114 .121 
Solano .153 .156 .141 
Sonoma .141 .150 .186 
Stanislaus .164 .178 .210 
Sutter .113 .123 .141 
Tehama .254 .292 .295 
Trinity .153 .124 .162 
Tulare .167 .179 
Tuolumne .121 .121 
Ventura 3 .220 
Yolo .183 .193 .192 
Yuba .177 .179 .205 
Average .161 .165 .183 
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indications of the presence of a well-defined cyclical tendency--for example, 
to have low turnover in 1974-75 with steady increases thereafter. The 
statistical portrayal of overall property turnover, as shown in Table 2-1, 
does imply that a great deal of data assemply and analytical work will be 
required to arrive at an accurate interpretation of the influences on 
turnover and the consequences of turnover. 
The statistical presentation in Table 2-1 is based on available data 
that were reported for workload calculations by county assessors to the 
State Board of Equalization. For each county, this is calculated by 
dividing the total number of on the nsecured into total 
number of property transfers. TI1ese are data to State Board 
of zation by county assessors. The turnover rates vary from 
a low of 0.091 in Imperial County to a high of 0.357 in Humboldt 
a remarkable range for such gross statistic. 
The statewide average of 0.183 for all 
however, an interesting statistic. If this rate of 
in all counties is, 
transfer is 
maintained in future, the implication is that within five to six years, 
turnover of will have occurred. There may, of , be 
some considerable number of real-estate that remain in the same 
ownership and other parcels that have two or more Thus, 
the implication of 100% turnover cannot be taken to mean that "base year" 
treatment is eliminated entirely. 
"Property transfers" as reported in these data, however, include many 
more items than are covered by Proposition 13 ~~d in the implementing legis-
lation enacted during June 1978. In future, the interpretation of property 
turnover can be improved by obtaining measures that reflect an analytically 
defined turnover concept. First, it will be important to separate the 
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measures of the number of parcels between housing, on the one hand, and 
non-housing real-estate on the other, and to disaggregate further as 
follows: (1) in housing real estate: single-family, one-to-four family 
parcels, and five-or-more family parcels; and (2) in non-housing real estate: 
industrial, agricultural, office, and commercial. A uniform classification 
for use by all counties would be needed; and prior to its adoption there 
should be consultations with urban-planning officials, real estate economists, 
financial-institution professionals, and other interested users of real-estate 
data. 
Four alternative concepts could also be considered for use on the 
data of each property category. For that category, let S be the number 
of existing parcels, E be the number of sales made, and C be the 
number of new parcels created through subdivision and construction activity. 
Then: (1) E/S is the turnover rate with no construction 
(2) (E + C)/S is the adjusted turnover on the pre-existing 
number of parcels. 
(3) (E + C)/(S + C) is the adjusted turnover on the end-of-year 
stock. 
and (4) (E + C + N)/(S + C - W) is the fully adjusted turnover on 
the fully corrected end-of-year stock, where N is the 
number of parcels created by subdivision but not built on, 
and W is the number of parcels withdrawn from the deed 
register through property consolidations, government 
condemnations, etc. 
Table 2-1 is based on measures in accordance with concept (3). 
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Concept (4) is the ideally satisfactory one, if the most comprehensive 
view of overall turnover is needed. For housing-market analysis, however, 
housing economists sometimes wish to analyze the turnover on existing 
property separately from the impact of newly built housing. For this 
purpose, then, they might wish to have for each housing category a separate 
measure according to concept (1) for comparison with new construction in 
that category. The reason is that economic variables affect transactions 
on existing houses differently from those on new buildings. 
We will continue with exploratory investigation of variables correlated 
with property turnover and of possible causal relationships. Among the 
variables under investigation as possible correlates of county turnover 
rates are: total population and population growth; employment; construction 
activity, including both housing starts and dollar volume of non-residential 
construction awards; retail sales. 
One example of the differences in turnover rates for different categories 
of property is shown in Table 2-2. For calendar years 1976 and 1977, respec-
tively, single-family housing turnover was 13.9% and 14.1% in Santa Clara 
County, a very active county in real-estate volume and new housing construc-
tion. The same table shows turnover in property other than single-family 
housing; for 1976 this rate was 9.5%, and for 1977, 8.7%. Many particular 
categories of business property--factory and office buildings, for example--
are said to have still lower turnover rates. There is good evidence to 
substantiate the view that disaggregated data on the number of parcels and 
on number of sales should be gathered for each county from now on, in order 
to facilitate analysis. 
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Table 2-2: Comparison of Single-family House Turnover Rate and Other 
Property Turnover, Santa Clara County 
* Number of Sales Transfers 
Number of Single-family Sales 
Single-family Sales as % of all Sales 
Number of Single-family Parcels 
Single-family Sales as % of Parcels 
Number of All Other Real Property Sales 
All Other Sales as % of All Sales 
Number of All Other Parcels 
All Other Real Property Transfers as 
% of Parcels 
1976 1977 
1/1 - 1201 1/1 - 12/31 
43,026 44,399 
37,229 39,113 
86.5% 88% 
268,824 271,407 
13.9% 14.1% 
5,797 5,286 
13.5% 12% 
61,169 60,813 
9.5% 8.7% 
*Includes sales of existing properties and of new parcels by subdivision; 
excludes quit-claim deeds and other technical transfers not qualifying as 
property transfers under Proposition 13. State Board of Equalization tables 
for the assessment year from 3/1/76 - 2/28/77 show 78,221 total property 
transfers of all types. 
Source: Mr. Loren Leavitt, M.A.I., Chief Appraiser, Santa Clara County, 
California. 
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As a final note on the problems of statistics, it should be pointed out 
that the statistics of real property diverge from the statistics of 
in important s. For example, the number of hous 
number of separately recorded ownerships; each multi-
is counted in housing statistics by the number of 
rental structure 
units it contains. 
When a change in the rules of the real-estate game occurs, as has happened 
in Proposition 13, there is creation of new real-property parcels and 
ownerships through conversion of rental housing to condominiums. We are not 
yet sure how the statistics will reflect the conversion to cooperative 
(stock) ownership, which also occurs. 
We now turn to detailed consideration of turnover in residential 
real property. 
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* Turnover of Owner-occupied Dwellings 
Since there is major interest in the effect of Proposition 13 on 
the turnover rate of single-family homes, it would be useful to have solid 
information on what that rate had been prior to the election and its change 
in assessment practices. Unfortunately, little data exists except for 
partial counts of sales--through multiple listing services, for example. 
What is lacking is the inventory base from which those sales came. Another 
frequently cited piece of information is the average life of a single-family 
home loan, usually assumed to be about eight years; not all home purchases 
are institutionally fina~ced, however, and loans may be refinanced for 
reasons other than sale. 
A recent regression study in Alameda County provides information which 
may be more significant than a turnover rate per se, namely, that cross-
sectionally over census tracts the Census-based turnover rate was not signifi-
cantly influenced by common socio-economic variables (family income, race, 
family size, etc.), so that the best predictor of the turnover rate is, in 
fact, the average turnover rate: approximately ten percent per year. Again, 
this is a cross-sectional constant; there are undoubtedly seasonal and 
cyclical fluctuations in the rate which remain to be described. 
Owner-occupancy turnover rates can be calculated from the decennial 
census. Counts of owner-occupied dwellings on the enumeration date can be 
compared with the number of homeowner households which moved in during the 
15-month period preceding enumeration; the number of owner-occupied dwellings 
constructed during that same 15-month period can be subtracted from both entries 
in order to restrict the turnover rate to the existing inventory. With this 
*Written by Wallace F. Smith. 
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adjustment and a correction for the 15-month period, estimated annual 
homeowner turnover rates for California metropolitan areas in 1969-70 
are as follows: 
Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove .13 
Bakersfield .08 
Fresno .07 
Los Angeles-Long Beach .07 
Modesto .08 
Oxnard-Ventura .11 
Sacramento .09 
Salinas-Monterey .08 
San Bernadino-Riverside-Ontario .10 
San Diego . 09 
San Francisco-Oakland • 07 
San Jose .08 
Santa Barbara • 09 
Santa Rosa • 09 
Stockton .06 
Vallejo-Napa . 08 
all California metropolitan areas .08 
all California urbanized areas .08 
all California • 08 
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The 1975 Annual Housing Survey suggests possible explanations for 
the variation in turnover among metropolitan areas, namely that lower rates 
occur for central cities as opposed to suburban areas, for older housing 
units, and for elderly homeowners as opposed to child-raising families. 
The following rates were calculated from the 1975 Survey--which does not 
permit the extraction of newly constructed units and so is not entirely 
comparable to the 1970 information: 
Central City 
Not in 
Central City Total 
San Francisco-Oakland SMSA 
All owner-occupied units built 
built 1939 or earlier 
husband-wife households, 
no non-relatives 
head age 65 or over 
1-person household, age 
San Diego SMSA 
All owner-occupied units 
built 1939 or earlier 
husband-wife households, 
no non-relatives 
head age 65 or over 
65 plus 
1-person household, age 65 plus 
.07 .10 
.05 .06 
.07 .10 
.01 .01 
.01 .04 
.09 
.06 
.10 
.01 
.02 
.12 
.06 
.12 
.05 
.05 
Sample sizes in the Annual Housing Survey are very small, and these 
rates--particularly those for elderly households--have large standard errors. 
Available home turnover data are inadequate for development of reasonably 
robust model from which the impact on turnover of property tax changes could 
be inferred. Some insight into likely response can, however, be gained 
from consideration of hypothetical but realistic homeowner options under 
assessment practices and property tax rates pre- and post-Proposition 13. 
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Effects of Reassessment on Sale of Owner-occupied Housing 
Proposition 13 provides that property is to be assessed at its 1975-76 
market value plus two percent per year so long as ownership remains unchanged. 
A change of ownership means that assessed value is changed immediately to accord 
with market value at that time (presumably as indicated by the price paid). 
This means that a family desiring to change its dwelling--because of a 
change in its job situation or family size, perhaps, or simply to upgrade 
its housing--incurs a financial penalty in the form of stepped up property 
tax liability. Quite apart from legal questions arising from this provision 
of Proposition 13 (which are treated in other portions of this study), 
reassessment on sale might seem likely to discourage homeowner mobility. 
If this effect were substantial, the replacement demand for housing might 
be weakened and the level of new construction would fall. Families would 
be more likely to stay put, perhaps undertaking improvements in their 
present homes rather than shopping for new ones. How strong is this effect? 
This question was put to a number of well-informed persons in the 
California housing industry--real tors, mortgage lenders, builders and others. 
The procedure was very informal, but the view was unanimous: there is 
pervasive uncertainty among buyers and sellers about how this will 
affect the housing market and strong judgmental belief on the of 
industry professionals that it will not prove to be significant. 
Informed professionals are not able to cite housing turnover rates 
per se; industry data in common use do not include such rates. But home 
sales indicators--numbers of listings and sales, trends in average prices 
and in loan volumes--do not yet reflect any clear impact of Proposition 13 
as of September 1978. Most of these indicators were off somewhat during 
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the spring of 1978 in comparison with the hyperactive preceding spring; 
this could have reflected uncertainty about the upcoming Proposition 13 
election, but the feeling is that it reflected other factors such as some 
increase in the cost of mortgage money and substantial fall-off of specQ-
lative/investor purchases of single-family homes. The rate of increase in 
average home prices sold through multiple listing was felt to be sharply 
lower in the summer of 1978--probably generally under ten percent per year--
than it had been in early 1977, approximating thirty percent in some areas, 
but that decline had begun in mid 1977. 
As for the direct impact of the reassessment rule on potential home 
sellers and , informed feel that the generally lower 
As soon 
as one starts to put numbers on the relationship, however, it becomes obvious 
that "it all 
subjective factors. 
on rates of and other partly 
Table 2-3 carries out a hypothetical case in point. It assumes a 
family owned a home worth $50,000 in 1975 which 1978 had risen in value 
(at ten percent per year) to $66,550; the family now contemplates selling 
this home to purchase one valued at $90,000. Under Proposition 13 what is 
the property-tax effect of the move, and how will this effect change if the 
move is deferred to 1983 or 1988? 
The table assumes market values rise uniformly at ten percent per year, 
and that pre-Proposition 13 tax rates are ten percent of assessed value. 
Beyond these assumptions it merely employs assessment and tax formulas 
written into law, including the homeowner exemption. (However, income tax 
consequences of changes in property-tax payments are not included.) 
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Table Proposition 13 Effect on Hypothetical Homeowner's Decision 
to Move 
Present Home-Market Value 
Assessed Value-Pre 13 
II 11 
-Post 13 
Property Tax -Pre 13 
" n -Post 13 
Value 
Pre 13 Assessed Value 
Post Property Tax 
Post-13, Buy 1978 
Assessed Value 
Property Tax 
Assessed Value 
Property Tax 
Assessed Value 
Property Tax 
Tax Increase on Move 
Pre-13 
Post-13, Buy 1978 
II 
II 
, Buy 1983 
, Buy 1988 
1975 
$50,000 
10,750 
1,075 
1978 
66,550 
14,888 
46,060 
1,489 
461 
90,000 
20, 
2 
83,000 
830 
586 
369 
107,179 
,045 
51,583 
2,504 
516 
144,946 
34,487 
3 
92,367 
924 
137,946 
1,379 
945 
408 
1988 
Inc. 10%/year 
M.V.x25%- 1,750 
,680 '75M.V.+2%/yr. -
4 A.V.xlO% 7,000 
577 A. V. X 1% 
Inc. 10%/year 
,609 M.V. - 1, 
5 A.V. X 
102, + 
1, A.V. X 1% 
144,ooo + 2%Lr~ool 
1,530 A.V. X 1% 
1,521 
450 
953 
1,687 
A.V. X 
- 1 
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Acknowledging that 11 it depends" to a considerable extent on the appreciation 
rate and pre-Proposition 13 tax rate assumed, as well as on the price gap 
between the new and the existing home, Table 2-3 points toward three distinct 
kinds of effects: 
1. Proposition 13 lowers the tax penalty for the family which wants to 
upgrade its housing. Pre-Proposition 13, the move in 1978 would raise 
annual property taxes from $1,489 to $2,075, an increase of $586. 
Under Proposition 13 the same move will raise taxes by only $369 
($830 minus $461). 
2. Proposition 13 provides a tax incentive for moving to a better home 
"now" rather than "later." If the family upgrades to the better house 
in 1978, the total property tax in 1983 is $924, which is $408 higher 
than the old house would have had in property tax for 1983. If the 
3. 
is postponed until 1983~ the total tax on the new house in 
that year is $1,379, or $863 more than if the old house had been retained. 
's reassessment to in" the 
homeowner in the sense that when a sufficient number of years has 
elapsed, the tax 
than pre-Proposition 
for buyi~g a better home is greater under 
The in tax is greater under 
ion 13 than without it. The hypothetical family which put off 
its move to 1988 would then incur a tax of $1,521 per year 
under rules, but with Proposition in effect. 
Of course the dollar difference may not seem great, particularly as it 
is a comparison and one which other factors that may 
enter into a decision move. The dollar penalty would also be at least 
partly offset by the years of post-13 tax saving in the older house. 
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The "lock-in" effect is clearest in the case of a family which must 
move for reasons other than a desire to its hous because of a 
job example. If this family sells its home in for 0 
and buys another for the same price, the Proposition 3 assessed value of 
its home rises from ,060 to $59,550 and annual taxes go up from 
to $596. The new figure is well below the pre-Proposition 13 tax of $1,489, 
however, and that is likely to color the thinking of people in the market 
for some period of time. 
interplay of factors involved in this comparison seems to justify 
the apparent widespread uncertainty among homeowners about what Proposition 
really means to them. It is in fact a complicated equation; the 
absolute dollar amounts, however, seem too small to worry about. That 
certainly 
from 
to the 
sionals. 
subjective responses which were obtained 
III. PROPOSITION 13 AND THE CALIFORNIA HOUSING MARKET* 
Homeowners - Basic Issues 
Pending more definitive analysis of the Proposition 13 phenomenon, 
it is reasonable to assume that California's 3.9 million homeowning house-
holds were a principal force encouraging introduction of the measure, and 
that most homeowners voted for it. Owners of rental property stood to 
gain from reduction of property taxes, but this is not a numerous or 
cohesive group. Renter households could expect only indirect and partial 
benefits from Proposition 13 at best. But homeowners knew with certainty 
what Proposition 13 would do for them immediately; based on 1976-77 
estimates from the Legislative Analyst's office, the average homeowner 
stood to gain $35.24 a month through the reduction in property taxes. This 
is 57 percent of the average monthly property tax cost to homeowners, $61.83. 
Both monthly figures would have escalated by 1978-79, of course. 
Is this amount of saving sufficient to change the market behavior of 
homeowners, homebuyers, or homebuilders? Will other of Proposition 13--
the rule regarding reassessment upon sale, in particular--counteract these 
effects? Will the immediate benefits to homeowners be weakened, offset or 
perhaps intensified by changes in the provision of local government services, 
or by further fiscal reforms? 
We can gain perspective on these questions by looking briefly at what 
was happening to the California homeowner's situation in the few years 
prior to Proposition 13. Household incomes had been rising sharply, reflecting 
not only general inflation but also a composite demographic factor of declining 
birth rates and increased labor force participation by married women. For 
example, in Santa Clara County between 1970 and 1975 household income per 
* Written by Wallace F. Smith. 
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capita had risen 50.4 percent, of which 22.5 percent was attributable to 
this demographic factor and the remaining 27.9 percent reflected wage gains 
including inflation (from Urban Land Institute Research Report #27). Taken 
together, these two effective demand factors explain most of the price 
escalation of homes in California from 1970 to the present and help us 
understand why the resale and construction markets during most of the period 
have been strong despite the appearance that families were being priced out 
of the homeowner market. Certain families were indeed being priced out, 
but they were being replaced by other households for which homeownership 
might not have been considered a "normal" housing choice. 
By informal estimates upwards of 80 percent of new homes in California 
have been sold over the past four or five years to childless, two-income 
households. According to a study of demographic characteristics of house 
purchasers for comparable four-bedroom houses 
in 1968 were two-person employed households. 
in San Jose, 43% of the buyers 
In 1976, employed 
households constituted 88% of house purchasers, and the household size 
averaged 2.8 persons. (See Urban Land Institute Research #27, 
"Effects of Regulation on Housing Costs: Two Case Studies," , Table 9.) 
Where husband and wife both work the traditional reason for wanting a 
single-family home--to raise children--is absent. Tax and investment 
incentives, however, more than compensate for this; the single family home 
is well suited to the tax needs of an employed couple unwittingly moving 
into onerous personal income brackets, and also provides an excellent 
inflation hedge for savings. This demand pressure on new homes spilled over 
into the existing home market. As market values rose, home assessed values 
followed, given the principles which assessors are required to follow and 
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the improved techniques at their disposal for updating their single-family 
dwelling rolls. Tax rates did not fall in proportion, so property tax 
burdens rose, not just for those who were buying new or existing houses, but 
for all homeowners including those with single ineomes and fixed incomes. 
Table 3-1 describes the situation of a hypothetical but generally 
realistic fixed income homeowner between 1973 and 1978. A retired individual~ 
for example, would be likely to be living in a debt-free home worth more 
than his or her current income would justify purchasing; property taxes 
would be the principal housing cost, taking 8.25 percent of income in 1973. 
Five years later, if home values increase at twelve percent per year (which 
approximates reality), assessments are updated, property tax rates do not 
fall, and the householder's money income remains fixed, property taxes take 
15.87 percent of that income. Inflation, together with rising taxes, 
reduces non-housing purchasing power by almost 38 percent. This person is 
faced with a choice between homeownership and food, let alone the other good 
things of life. Any tax relief would be desperately desired. Sufficient 
tax relief would allow this person to remain in his or her home. As elderly 
people have less occasion to move (because of job changes or changing family 
size), the threat of reassessment upon purchase of another dwelling would 
have little meaning. For this person, Proposition 13 is a nearly unmitigated 
godsend. In the example of Table 3-l supposing market value had reached 
$60,000 by 1975, the new property-tax expense in 1978 would be $1,020 per 
year less. Proposition 13 clearly helps these households stay where they 
are, which in itself should cause the inventory turnover rate to fall. In 
the past five years, undoubtedly, many fixed-income households in California 
were forced to sell their homes because of rising property values, assessments, 
and taxes. 
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Table 3-l: Inflation and Property Tax Burden on Hypothetical 
Fixed Income Homeowner 
Harket Value of home 
Assessed Value 
Property tax 
Fixed income 
Property tax as percent 
of income 
Income after property tax 
Purchasing power (1973 $) 
Loss of purchasing power 
due to property tax and 
inflation 
Effect of Proposition 13: 
suppose 1975 market value 
of home - $60,000 
then 1978 assessed value = 
a.'1d property tax = 
leaving for other living costs 
an increase in 1978 $'s of 
$40,000 
8.250 
825 
10,000 
8.25% 
9,175 
9, 
$70,494 
15,874 
1,587 
10,000 
15. 
8,413 
5' 
3,449 
56,672 
9,433 
1,020 
12% appreciation rate 
M.V. X .25 - 1,750 
assume 10% rate 
assume 8% inflation rate 
::: 
.6% of $9,175 
,000 X (1.02) 3 -
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For other homeowning households the pre-Proposition 13 situation is 
far less clear. Property taxes are only a part of the fiscal burden on 
homeowners which state-wide measures can deal with, about 40 percent of 
the total of property, sales, and state income taxes paid by homeowners in 
1976-77 (from Legislative Analyst study). The combined impact of these 
three taxes was moderately progressive, rising from about 8.5 percent of 
income at the $10,000 to $20,000 income level, to just under 11 percent of 
income when income was between $50,000 and $75,000. In terms of household 
income, the property- and sales-tax burdens were regressive; but this was 
more than offset by the structure of state income-tax rates. 
For households whose current income was at least keeping up with 
inflation and whose home was appreciating faster than the general inflation 
rate while property-tax rates were relatively stable or even falling, it is 
not easy to see an a priori concern about property taxes per se. Putti~g 
the three major taxes together, however, and taking into account the combined 
effect of inflation (even if incomes rise at the same rate), the progressive 
structure of unindexed state income-tax rates, and the accelerated rise in 
property values, we can construct a picture of the overall tax burden which 
homeowners in 1976-77 might have forecast five years hence, by 1981-82. 
Figure 3-1 traces the composite tax burden as a percent of income for three 
situations--the actual pattern in 1976-77, the pattern which would exist in 
1981-82 assuming 8 percent per year increase in incomes and in the consumer 
price index and escalation of house prices at 12 percent per year without 
reductions in property tax rates, and, finally, the 1981-82 situation adjusted 
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for Jarvis-Gann's direct effects--i.e., lower property taxes. 11 The two 
forecast lines thus assume real household income remains unchanged; 
inflation and the tax system cause the proportion of income going for 
these taxes to rise. 
The pre-Proposition 13 projected escalation of tax burden is massive. 
(If Federal income-tax burden were taken into account, the projection would 
be still more alarming. Since Proposition 13 affected only state fiscal 
burdens, the role of the Federal income tax has been omitted from this 
1 • ) ana ... ysls. The homeowner in the $10,000 to $15,000 bracket (real, 
income) who 8.7 of income for 
' 
sales, and state income 
taxes in could see in 
years. For the ,000 ,000 the 
burden increases from 10.2 to 
even with itself 
into ever brackets. 
increase house and therefore the tax, in the 
that tax still would account about 
three-tax The unindexed income-tax structure j 
for the fference in the inflation rates and 
12 for houses. 
tax 
income class 
class and 
among all classes within 
lower limit of the class. It is an arbi 
mates the shifting that would be with more 
in this case slightly underestimates the upward shift in median income pro-
duced by an ~~nual rate of 8 percent. Tax burden percentages for the lowest 
and highest classes are based on assumed midpoints and are consequently only 
generally representative. Income-related tax-payment data were taken from 
a study prepared by the Legislative Analysts Office in the Spring of 1978. 
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Figure 3-1 
Effects of Proposition 13 on Projected Tax Burden ~ California Homeowners 
Assuming Real Income Unchanged 1976-77 to 1981-82 
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The direct effect of Proposition 13 is to lower the whole structure of 
tax burdens relative to what might have been 
with the structure exist in 19 , we have no income 
to the taxpayer while the structure becomes more progressive. 
L~e homeo~1er between ,000 and 000 in 8. 
of income for these three taxes, will be 
.·~~~ Proposition 13 (on the assumed inflation rates used here, ~~d before 
indexing measures). That is better than the .1 burden which 
have been anticipated before Jarvis-Gann, but it is still an increase in 
tax burden. Tax relief did not arrive with 
these ections, secondary of 13 upon state and Federal 
income tax liability were not taken into account. The benefit of Proposition 
13 to homeowners is thus overstated.) 
This exercise, however hypothetical, does seem to have two 
implications for the prospective behavior of the homeowner market. One 
is that the complaint of the non-fixed-income owner is not with 
the tax, but with the overall level of taxation In a very real 
sense, it is not extravagance of local that consumes 
real income so much as it is the progressive structure of state income (and 
Federal) tax rates. This would say that homeowners supporting 13 
were not necessarily asking for wholesale reductions in the level or the cost 
of local services. Local services will still play a role in the decision to 
select a home. 
The second apparent implication is that without complete indexing of 
state--and Federal--income tax rates, homeowning families are faced with 
continued increases in their real fiscal burdens which may be at least partly 
s 
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offset by almost tax-free appreciation of their homes. This is a time to 
settle more firmly than ever into home-ownership or to attain it if one 
can. Although it is difficult to translate appreciating property into cash 
flow to pay rising living and tax costs, that is the game toward which many 
households are being pushed--just about the only game in town. Proposition 
13 encourages speculative holding and refinancing of real property, 
particularly in the context of inflation and lagging reform of other taxes. 
Figure 3-2 shows projected 1981-82 tax burdens with and without 
Proposition l3's direct effect, in terms of current rather than real incomes. 
In a household with $35,000 income was paying 9.1 percent of that 
~~A~o~~'', sa~es, and state income-taxes; in 1981-82 a family with for 
$35,000 would be 
percent with 
with $ 
five years later, 
about 9.5 without Proposition and 6.4 
They are different families, however. The 
would have an income f more than $51,000 
an8 rate of increase. 
an apparent across-the-board easing in tax burden 
shows 
from Proposition 
13, but that is misleading. 
It should be noted that both Figures 3-l and 3-2 assume homeowners do 
not move their of residence between 1976-77 and 1981-82, that is, 
the increase in taxes post-Proposition 13 is limited to 2 percent 
per year after first being reduced 57 percent of the initial level. 
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Figure 3-2 
Projected Current Income Burden of Major California Taxes 
0 
on Homeowners, 1981-82, and Effects of Proposition 13 
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Property Transfer Mechanisms 
Because the great majority of owner-occupied housing changes hands 
with the assistance of mortgage financing and of real-estate brokers and 
title companies, the recording of a deed will surely continue as the 
dominant form. Contracts of sale have on occasion been used in the past, 
however, for either of two purposes: 
First, there was a recent flurry of interest in them as a means of 
circumventing the "due-on-sale" clause that is standard in most mortgage 
terms. This clause enables the lender to force a new negotiation of mort-
gage terms rather than its acceptance, automatically, of assumption of the 
outstanding mortgage by the new buyer. 
In Tucker vs. Lassen Savings and Loan Association (1974), the California 
Supreme Court invalidated enforcement of a due-on-sale clause when the property 
was sold by land contract. In Wellenkamp vs. Bank of America (1978), the same 
court held that an institutional lender could not ordinarily enforce due-on-sale. 
While brokers' associations have advocated use of a model contract of 
sale, it does not seem likely that this alternative to outright ownership 
transfer will become important in ordinary real-estate transactions. 
A second way in which contracts of sale have been used is the conveyance 
of property in inner-city, depressed areas, where the costs of property 
transfer through deed recording and the problems of financing are historic 
barriers to real-estate transactions. There is deep objection among expert 
observers of the real-estate market against the use of contracts of sale in 
such situations; for the normal protections to both seller and buyer are not 
available, title may be clouded, and other aspects of the transaction may 
go wrong to the great disadvantage of the parties. 
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The Diminished Lure of the Suburbs 
Proposition 13 poses at least a threat to further 
of suburban infrastructure which could materi reduce the incentive 
opportunity for urban households to leave central cities. This 
aspect of Proposition 13, rather than the change in assessment 
seems far more likely to cause a slowdown in the turnover rate of 
owner-occupied housing. 
The traditional U.S. urban property tax makes suburban expansion 
essentially self-financing. A new tract of houses may require a new fire 
station, but it creates the locally controlled tax base to pay for that 
fire station--its construction, equipment, and operation. As the tract 
fills, the fiscal base beneath a central-city fire station may weaken, but 
the suburban community does not have to solve that problem. Suburban 
infrastructure will perforce be newer and probably more attractive than 
that in the central city, thus adding to the pull which suburbs exert on 
households and contributing to the rate of turnover and of replacement of 
housing inventory. 
Under Proposition 13, with its one percent limit on property taxes and 
restricted growth of assessments, new suburban infrastructure is not likely 
to be fiscally self-justifying. State funds may be allocated to support new 
infrastructure, but thus far no permanent assurances to that effect have 
even been suggested by state government. The automatic link between public 
infrastructure expense and public revenue has been broken. Suburban 
communities, where most new single-family home construction takes place, 
must henceforth be very cautious about approving or annexing developments. 
Such communities can levy greatly enlarged permit fees as a partial means of 
36 
recouping the loss of property tax base for new developments, and this 
practice is apparently spreading very rapidly. It presents developers 
with an interesting dilemma: if they contest the increases in fees (on 
grounds that they are new taxes and thus prohibited by Proposition 13}, 
they could force communities to suspend development permits altogether. 
The removal of public-school costs from the local property-tax as 
a result of Proposition 13 is welcomed by some real-estate brokers and 
developers--perhaps a majority. If there was one element in the pre-
Proposition 13 fiscal equation which tended to make developments 
unattractive to the community, it was the fact or belief that school expansion 
tended to raise average school costs and hence to increase taxes for present 
residents. Now the community need not concern itself about increased 
school costs. The remaining tax levy in addition to new-development fees 
~~d user fees may cover the public infrastructure and service 
costs, with a net improvement in the developer's fiscal impact argument for 
permits in some cases. 
What has happened since the passage of Proposition l The fact is 
that significant other factors enter in, as well as the considerable lag 
between local approvals and construction, to obscure the impact of Propo-
sition 13 on single-family home construction. Interest rates rose percep-
tibly in late spring 1978; on the other hand, there was a spurt of starts in 
June to avoid new energy requirements which took effect in July. By mid-
summer, starts seemed somewhat low, but industry professionals did not 
attribute this to Proposition Indeed, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that there remains an inventory of serviced land which can keep construction 
going--perhaps at a modest level--while state government develops longer-run 
systems for channelling suburban tax revenues back to the support of 
suburban functions. 
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The Rental Market 
Owners of rental housing stood to benefit significantly from lowering 
of the property tax rate through Proposition 13. From data developed by 
the Legislative Analyst's office, it appears that for 1976-77 twenty-four 
percent of gross rental income in such properties was going to pay property 
taxes. Given the normal leveraging of ownership, a reduction of nearly 
sixty percent in this expense would materially improve cash flow. Even 
allowing for the increase in income-tax liability of owners, this change 
in the economics of owning might have been expected to stimulate investment 
in and construction of rental housing. 
It begins to appear that Proposition 13 has made the rental-housing 
investment climate worse instead of better--based on conversations with 
informed professionals. The reason is that rent control has become far 
more likely--at some level and in some form--because of tenant complaints 
that they did not share in the benefits of Proposition 13 as many clearly 
expected they would. The issue is intensely political, but there is a 
perceptible effect upon the market; owners are described as "wanting out. 11 
Conversion to condominiums or cooperatives has become even more attractive 
for these investors. 
in the sale of There may thus be a short-lived and aberrant 
residential rental properties as investors attempt to 
holdings. The reassessment-on-sale provision of Proposit 
seem likely to be a material consideration in these sales. 
California rental property assessed values appear based 
these 
13 does not 
as 
on gross 
income multipliers, it is far from clear which way typical assessed values 
are headed. 
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Among California's renter households, the percentage of income going 
for rent decreases as income rises, but the proportion of that rent which 
is accounted for by property taxes is virtually constant across income 
levels (from 1976-77 data in Legislative Analyst office report). (See 
Table 3-2.) Thus, if landlords were forced to return their Proposition 13 
windfall to tenants, the effect would be a greater proportional benefit 
for low-income tenants than for high-income tenants. 
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Table 3-2: Rent and Taxes in Relation 
Total 
Under $5,000 26.9% n.a. n.a. 
$5,000- 7,500 16.2 30% 
7,500- 10,000 14.7 23 
10,000 - ,000 22.4 18 24 
15,000 - 20,000 11.1 14 
20,000 - 25,000 4.7 13 25 
25,000 - 30,000 1.9 12 25 
,000 - 50,000 1.6 9 25 
,000 & over 0.5 n. a. 
IV. PROPOSITION 13 AND NON-RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE 
Owners of business real property will benefit from both the "base year" 
treatment (1975-76 fair market value as basis for assessment of property 
under continuous same ownership) and the one percent maximum of property 
tax on current fair market value. 
"Base-year" benefits to business owners will be particularly large, 
of course, wherever a sharp escalation in actual economic value has occurred 
since 1975-76. Here are examples: 
1. Oil in the ground, or coal reserves, which may have already ballooned 
in value since the base year and it may be argued, qualify for 
base-year valuation plus two percent per year; 
2. 11 Improvements" that have low cost when made, but increase markedly in 
economic with the passage of a few years. An given 
by the State Board of is the treatment of orchards (and, 
presumably, vineyards). When young trees are they have 
low cost per unit as property After five to seven years, 
they reach peak economic productivity, but assessed value is based upon 
fair market value (presumably, close to the installed cost) at the 
time of planting, plus two percent per year compounded. Thus, the 
orchard is taxed on a grossly understated basis for the years of peak 
productivity. 
Then ensues an irony: Proposition as passed in June 1978 contains 
no mechanism, according to the State Board of Equalization, for reducing 
assessed valuation when the economic value of real property falls, as indeed 
it can. In the orchard case, the declining value of older trees cannot be 
reflected in decreased property tax; on the contrary, the clock keeps ticking 
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at a two percent per year increase in adjusted fair market value and thus 
in assessed value. Because the reduced productivity of old trees cannot 
be recognized in lower taxation, the orchard operator is rationally obliged 
to pull out the old trees sooner than he otherwise would and replace 
them with new planting. The one-percent limit on property tax does decrease 
the property-tax costs of holding the asset by approximately 57%, as 
against the pre-Proposition 13 situation, a factor which gives the orchard 
owner incentives to hold the old trees longer. Figure 4-l shows the effects 
of the two factors. Here, the investment cost of the tree is assumed to be 
annualized as an interest and amortization charge. The economic life of 
the tree is shortened from B years to A years because property tax cannot 
be adjusted downward when the net operating income of the tree falls in the 
later years. 
The size of the benefit of base-year treatment will grow at a 
rate over time if market values of business real grow more than 
two per year. Suppose, for example, that market valuation grows for 
ten years at the recent general inflation rate of 
sian for two percent per year escalation is six 
net differential grows by approximately six percent per year 
The 
less, 
the end of the tenth year, each dollar of base-year value, at 8% 
will have grown to $2.1589. Assessed value will have grown to $1.2190. The 
differential is $0.9399, and the tax paid (at the one tax level) 
through "base year" treatment is only 56% of what would be 
percent of the tenth-year fair market value in this example. 
at one 
Base-year treatment is preserved by maintaining continuous sa~e 
The example shows that advantageous tax treatment will grow to substantial 
proportions over time, and the incentive to preserve it will become greater 
and greater. 
the 
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annual 
revenue 
and costs 
per tree 
interest and 
amortization 
Figure 4-1 
Economic Life of a Tree Having Varying Produetivity over Time 
"old" property 
tax 
A B 
age o:r tree 
*annual net operating income = total revenue per tree minus labor 
and materials costs of maintenance 
and harvesting. 
net 
operating 
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Types of Business Property Transactions 
Business entities can arrange any of a wide variety of real-estate 
transactions, including choice of the instrumentalities (corporation, 
corporate subsidiary, limited partnership, nominee, etc.) to act 
as seller &~d as buyer, and the choice, also, of contractual device: 
straight ownership transfer; conventional leasehold; sale and lease back; 
contract of sale, etc. (See Maisel and Roulac, 1976.) Timing and charac-
teristics of these business real-estate transactions have long been influenced 
by tax considerations. The influence of Proposition 13 is only one such 
case in point and, very possibly, not the most significant. (For example, 
the U.S. Congress is considering extensive reductions in the 
tax; if these become law, they may outweigh in significance for transaction-
making the reduced annual payment of +- + • ) ~oaxavlOn. 
In order to preserve "base-year" as sment, business 
owners of real property will need to avoid transfers as defined 
in ition 13 and in Senate Bill and Senate Bill 2212, the 
has been defined 
title 
with certain exclusions that are not to business tr&~sactions in 
general. (See State Board of Equalization, No. 78/120, ll' 1978.) 
Leases of more than ten-year term qualify as property transfers under these 
new rules. 
As executives and their legal and tax advisors become more familiar 
with the possibilities, there will no doubt be many ingenious solutions to 
the problem of defining contracts to greatest mutual advantage of owner and 
user. Financing agencies are often deeply involved also in the determination 
of the most advantageous treatment of business deals. 
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The complications from Proposition 13 concerning the property-tax 
liabilities of the Irvine Company and of the many owners in the major develop-
ment of the city of Irvine in Orange County are considerable. Two factors 
produced special problems: the widespread use of long-term land-lease 
agreements in that development and the sale of controlling interest in the 
Irvine Company in 1977. It will be some time before the issues are finally 
resolved. 
Many commercial properties, in California and elsewhere, are occupied 
by tenants on rental contracts that are "net" contracts. The tenant agrees 
to pay all utilities, insurance, and property taxes (and may, indeed, agree 
to pay some other annual expenses). The owner receives a net payment for 
the use of the land (or land and structure) only. Owners have often regarded 
this as advantageous because it has protected them from the inflationary 
cost increases of the past few years. Now, with the passage of Proposition 
13, there is a dramatic reversal of form: the business receives the 
benefit of the reduction in property tax to a 1% ceiling and the reduction 
to "base-year" treatment to the date the lease came into force. Until the 
lease term is up, the property owner cannot obtain a share of the cost 
reduction; it goes as a windfall to the tenant. If the owner of the property 
were to sell it, however, the new rules of the game call for reassessment 
at fair market value at the time of property transfer. The larger windfall 
is ordinarily the reduction of tax to the one-percent level, but owner 
can threaten to inflict on tenant the loss of the base-year treatment. With 
this leverage, owner may be able to claim a share of the windfall immediately. 
The greater possibility for capture of a large portion of the property-tax 
reduction comes, of course, when the lease expires and is due for renegotiation. 
45 
At this point, owner may take the position that lessor should be willing 
to pay occupancy costs as high as were implicit in the earlier lease 
agreement, including the effect of property taxes. In this way, owner is 
claiming a gain that in due course should mean capitalization of the tax 
reduction into increased property value. 
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Business Property Transaction Volume 
While non-residential construction trends are measured and reported 
regularly from permit data for each region of California, there is no 
convenient source of regional or statewide data on business-property 
transfer transactions. The staff of the State Board of Equalization may soon 
collect data on the volume of business-property transfers from county assessors. 
To be useful for analytical purposes, total business-property transfers 
would need to be broken into classes of business property: industrial, 
agricultural, extractive industries, office, commercial. 
For example, the Real Estate Research Council of Northern California 
uses quarterly totals of deed recordings in each 
County Recorders, as a measure of real-estate-market 
Northern California Real Estate Report, Vol. , No. 5 
for an 
, obtained from 
(See 
) ' pp. 23-24 
the Recorder of 
Deeds and of the Tax Assessor--have data on file from which measures of 
transaction volume in each property category could be constructed. But 
for maximum of transfer data, the files of each county should 
sification so that aggregation and 
comparisons could be undertaken. 
County assessors do have new problems of identifying some business deals 
that qualify as property transfers under Proposition 13 and the implementing 
legislation. In particular, business firms do not always need, from their 
point of view, to record leases and contracts; yet any lease of ten-year 
term or longer qualifies as a property transfer for the purposes of property-
tax treatment under Proposition 13. Assessors will probably use such clues 
as utilities hook-ups and mail changes to trace such business transfers, as 
47 
they already do for checking homeowner's tax exemption claims. In addition, 
the business-property statement that each business entity is required to 
file will be expanded to include information on leases by having assessors 
ask for direct reports in future from the business entities themselves on 
the status of any lease on the property in question. 
48 
Business Property Exclusions from Proposition 13 Treatment 
The State Board of Equalization has authority under California statute 
to undertake direct, statewide ~ssessment of ~ertain types of business 
property. These include the real property owned by regulated gas and electric 
utility companies, telephone companies, and railroads. Also, radio telephone 
companies and some water companies fall under the State Board of Equalization's 
direct jurisdiction, and so does the assessment of timber values. The State 
Board of Equalization has taken the position that Proposition 13 did not 
cover these case and that it may continue to assess these regulated 
industries on the basis of current fair market values. Court 
decision the State Board of ion position, but appeals and 
other lit may leave this issue unresolved for some years. With 
to gas, electric, and utilities, if a reduction of 
tax occur because of the the base year and the 
one limit ded by , the Publi Utilities Commission 
would undoubtedly take account of the cost reduction and order a 
reduction of utility rates. Thus, the chief effect of the 
regulated public utilities under Proposition 13 would be not to increase 
their profits but to reduce utility rates and to reduce governmental tax 
revenues. 
State law already provides a special basis for evaluation of timber 
in that tax payment is made at the time of timber harvest. We cannot 
attempt here to explore further the possible consequences of Proposition 13 
on the forest-products industries. 
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Effects of Proposition 13 upon Other Business Investment Decisions 
Some business investment decisions have a large component classified 
as real property, whereas others are concerned mainly with machinery and 
equipment or with the acqu~ition of other productive assets not considered 
to be real property. general consequence of Proposition 13 is that the 
real-property component of a business investment will now have a reduced 
annual holding cost. If no other changes of the cost and revenue elements 
of the investment decision occur~ this reduced holding cost will cause some 
business investment possibilities that were previously rejected to become 
attractive. 
Some campaign arguments before Proposition 13 was passed claimed that 
it would stimulate business investment in California. At this time, it is 
necessary to be cautious about the consequences. As far as new factory 
investment is concerned, most previous studies of industrial locational 
decisions put the annual cost of property taxation low on the list of 
considerations. Access to markets, availability of labor, and quality of 
local-government services (including the quality of schools) have been 
found generally to be of greater importance to the locational decision. 
Another type of business investment decision also illustrates the 
current uncertainties. Developers choose sites for planned regional shopping 
centers on the basis of expected growth in the population of the regional 
area and the concurrent development of road systems and other infrastructure 
for residential communities. While the post-Prgp6sition 13 property-tax 
costs of a new regional-shopping-center complex would be lower than before, 
and this cost reduction would make tke potential investment more attractive, 
the rate of population growth of the area might be slowed by the increased 
costs of the residential developer and by slower actions of local government 
so 
agencies in approving residential developments. The sales-revenue potential 
of a shopping-center development is a far more crucial variable in the 
investment decision than is the annual cost of property taxes. 
Thus, it will take further analysis, and the unfolding of new evidence 
over a period of time, to determine the consequences of Proposition 13 
for business investments. 
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modify the assessed value to the fair market value at the time of the 
transfer. This is not a mechanical because some transfers 
field work and other corroborat information to identify. 
County assessors did not have sufficient staff to undertake 
simultaneously both of these tasks before issuing new "Prop. 13" assessed 
values to taxpayers, and each county assessor chose how to deploy the 
available staff. The law apparently permits supplemental tax bills to be 
rendered to taxpayers, based on corrected values, at any time up to several 
years after the event. It is likely to be a year or more before all of 
assessment from the passage of are 
of. In the meantime, there will remain some uncertainties 
for both owners and homeowners. 
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Appraisal Standards for Mortgage Financing 
Mortgage underwriting for hous 
primary attention to the fair market value f the the time f 
mortgage application, but there is also some consideration of the owner's 
income position and ability to cope with the costs of home ownership. 
Reduction in property-tax payments eases these costs. For this reason, 
security analysts, evaluating the portfolio quality of and loan 
associations soon after passage of Proposition 13, offered the judgment that 
existing mortgages were improved in soundness. 
Appraisers of rental hous for 
specific in analyzing the ability of the 
financ 
to 
purposes are very 
the proposed 
loan. In the early months after passage of Proposition 13, however, 
appraisal standards and formulas were not adjusted to take account of 
the expected reduction in property-tax liability. Instead, real-estate 
appraisers continued to use the same multipliers as before in 
the capital valuation of rental property. Until the assessors made 
definitive determinations of assessed values, appraisers resisted 
downward adjustments of property-tax payments. Also, tenant groups, state 
political leaders, and city councils began almost immediately to talk of 
voluntary or compulsory rent rollbacks and possible rent control. A rent 
rollback approximately equal to the reduction in property-tax payment would 
leave the owner of rental property in essentially the same net-income 
position as before Proposition 13; and the conservative response of 
appraisers might well be, therefore, to leave appraised values unadjusted 
until the question of rent rollback became clarified. 
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A Remedy Needed for the Lack of Downward Adjustability in Assessed Values 
From the standpoint of its effects on rational decision-making, the 
most glaring weakness of Proposition 13 is the lack of a-means for reducing 
the assessed value of a property if its market value or its economic 
productivity falls. The owner-occupant of housing would be affected in the 
event of severe deterioration in local real-estate values. Also, if a home 
purchased before 1975 is damaged by fire, flood, or other catastrophe and 
must then be replaced at a much higher construction cost, the assessed 
valuation would not be reduced when the loss occurred, but would be 
increased at the current market valuation as of the time of the 
ofbusiness property have specific needs for adjustment of 
assessed valuation and annual tax if value of property is reduced 
by loss or decline in productivity. We earlier discussed some 
anomalous consequences in Section 4. 
, some remedy is needed for the lack of downward adjustability 
of assessed value. The State Board of Equalization takes the position 
that under law such downward adjustments cannot be made at the 
discretion of the county assessor. The constitutional status of 
Proposition 13 appears to require that the remedy be another constitutional 
amendment. 
In the past, different local jurisdictions adopted policies of providing 
from property-tax revenues differing mixes and qualities of educational 
services; water, sewer, and other utilities; and other local services. Also, 
the costs of producing these services sometimes varied ~ccording to the 
relative efficiency of local governments and were affected py ecanamies or 
diseconomies of scale in the production of governmental services. 
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Proposition 13, at one stroke, eliminated the differentials in property-
tax payments as related to governmental services. Taxpayers could previously 
choose between a higher-service and higher-cost community and a lower-service, 
lower-cost community. As local governments must now adjust to a new budgetary 
reality in which revenues are much less subject to local decisions, these 
options and choices will now be reduced. Property taxpayers will not face 
differences in tax liability from locality to locality for the costs of 
local services. In the long run, communities are likely to become more 
similar in overall levels of service, though still differentiated in the 
composition of services provided and in the effectiveness of local government. 
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Concluding Comments About Proposition l3's Impacts on Real-estate Markets 
The new conditions in the markets for both housing and nonhousing real 
estate include not only an unequivocal, permanent reduction in the cost of 
holding existing property, but also a series of other effects that are uncertain 
in direction and magnitude. The early response of decision-makers to this 
uncertainty has, quite naturally, been to "go slow" in adjusting to the 
new market conditions. 
It appears that Proposition 13 imposes some penalty to an acknowledged 
property transfer; thus, we may see more use of contracts of sale and of 
unrecorded lease agreements, unless participants in real-estate markets 
become convinced that county assessors can quickly find and deal with such 
unrecorded transfers. With the incentives for concealment, adequate 
enforcement will require more resources in county assessors' offices. 
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